Customer education is not a plan
Monday, March 19th, 2007I would like to pick up the thought thread from my Feb 23, “Pictures and fraud detection” entry, you may want to scroll down there, read that and come back. Tying into that thread are two news items from last week that you should also read or at least scan before continuing:
- Tracking the Password Thieves by Brian Krebs / Security Fix
- Thieves raid online accounts in penny stock scam by Kathleen Pender / San Francisco Chronicle
So what’s special about two more “people got ripped off online” stories?
First tie-in to my Feb 23 posting is the fact that this is just another in an ongoing line of similar stories and regardless of whether they indicate some new attack vector or not, these add up to an ongoing drumbeat to many consumers that they should continue to avoid the online channel. This of course has immediate impact on e-commerce bottom lines as revenue is lost and profit margin and productivity gains remain unrealized.
Second tie-in to the previous post is that the seven affected brokerage firms spent roughly $300k each “attempting to make their customers whole”. Being a vendor in this space I can pretty confidently assert these seven firms could have purchased “a product” on average for no more than that and it would have prevented this attack. Note the attackers logged in as the victims. Simple password theft, though the method of password obtainment is not mentioned in the pump-n-dump article.Â
- Unbelievable to me that John Reed Stark of the SEC indicates the thieves “did not penetrate the brokerage firms’ infrastructure or security systems”. If I were one of the 30 - 40 victims, I would certainly be taking issue with that statement. The thieves make off with $732,941, the brokerages spend $2,000,000 making victims whole (no, the math doesn’t make sense to me either, must be some “hush-type” money involved, eh?), the attackers likely have lots of personal identity information on these same victims and there wasn’t a penetration of the security system? Really?! Or is he saying this is how they designed their security system to work?
Third tie-in, fraud detection is a great thing, but it is lousy all alone as a security system. Did you only install motion detectors in your house when you installed your security system? Didn’t think so. Time to add truly strong perimeter, i.e. strong authentication, to your defense-in-depth strategy.
These are all obvious things really, but the last and actually most important thing I’d like to tie-in here is:
Can we please quit playing the “educate the end-user” card? This can no longer be proffered by serious security professionals as a prominent part of a security plan.  I would actually argue it is exactly the lack of a plan that leads to this being plied as a significant e-commerce security component. I’m reminded of my favorite line from my favorite B-movie, Tremors.  While running for their lives from the monster, Kevin Bacon asserts “I have a plan”, to which Fred Ward replies, “Running isn’t a plan, running is what you do when a plan fails!”.
Please go back and revisit the list of victims in Brian Krebs piece on Password Thieves. So only one of them is a computer security professional from IBM, but these aren’t exactly Ma & Pa Smith online bankers either. Do I have anything against Ma & Pa Smith? Of course not. On the contrary, Ma & Pa Smith are the realization of the adoption being sought. Get everyone to the presumably low cost online channel, once you quit paying “make customer whole” settlements, anyway. If we can’t provide an environment where even arguably “educated” consumers, such as these, can safely and confidently transact, what hope is there to get the timid, the paranoid or just plain “newbie” to come join us? By the way, at this point, aren’t they only showing properly rational behavior given the identity theft and account compromise coverage they see and hear daily?
We need to give our current and would-be customers a security environment that protects them not only from the thieves, but from themselves and the complexities of their computing environment. Customers shouldn’t have to maintain associates degrees in computer security and maintain a “25 best practices” list to get online and get something done. We need to give them secure tools properly designed to be “user-proof”, attacker thwarting and still simple to use. I know that for me, this is the starting point of all design discussions in my particular arena, strong authentication and digital credential issuance. How about where you ply your trade?
Â
Â